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As modern corporate enterprise developed, the separation between ownership 
and management turned the benefit conflict between executives and corporate into a 
focus of internal corporate governance. An urgent problem to solve is how to cut 
down the agency cost. Executive pay-performance was regarded as the effective 
method to solve the first class agent problem. With the deeper research of agent 
problem on major shareholders and minority shareholders, lots of literature 
considered that conflict between major shareholders and minority shareholders is the 
problem of security market which be characterized by concentrated ownership. The 
embezzling made major shareholders stand in opposition of minority shareholder and 
executive who is inspired by pay-performance compensation should be balanced 
power to tunneling as corporate internal controller. However, board of listed 
companies in a major of countries are controlled by major shareholder and the board 
have the right to make the decision that whether to hire executives or not and 
executives’ salary. Under the situation, whether executives are repressors or assistant 
of major shareholders’ tunneling? 
In this paper, 8832 samples of China’s non-financial sectors in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen A-shared listed over period 2010-2014 was chosen to make an empirical 
study about the benefit exchange between large shareholders and managers. After the 
summarization of empirical literature at home and abroad, based on the relevant 
theories, for instance Asymmetric Information theory, Principal-agent Theory and 
Optimal Contract theory, this paper use descriptive statistics and regression method to 
do analysis that tunneling effect on management pay-performance sensitivities and 
the effect of CEO turnover on tunneling. 
This empirical result shows that even though a major of listed companies in 
China’s security market has be equipped a system for compensation based 
performance, the tunneling behavior of major shareholders would reduce the 















balanced power to major shareholders’ tunneling maybe cooperate with major 
shareholders to tunneling. This paper offers some suggestion to avoid the benefit 
exchange and cooperation between executives and large shareholders for tunneling. 
In corporate internal governance, intensive supervision on executives and board, 
increasing the shareholding ratio of major shareholders and improve incentive 
system. In external governance environment, improving the professional manager 
market, heighten information disclosure requirement, improving relevant laws and 
regulations. This paper offers some suggestions in the aspect of corporate internal 
governance and external governance environment. 
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